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Failure to obtain "adequate" medical care for a child constitutes child neglect, which maybe
used as the basis for prosecution of parents, removal of the child from the home, or
court-ordered medical treatment. "Adequate" care is usually construed as that which is given
by a licensed physician, but, in case of dispute, courts almost never engage in choosing one
medical approach over another. The principle that parents may not refuse medical care,
however, is made very difficult when children have malignancies-the long-term nature of the
treatment means that, ifthe child is left at home, court order or not, the parents may flee with
their child. Removing the child from the home, however, adds that trauma to the ill child's
burdens. Questions should be askedbeforemakingarequest to acourt toorderatherapywhich
will prolong but not save a child's life if the parents would prefer to spare their child the side
effects. Parents, however, may always refuse to permit their child to participate in research
studies, no matter how promising. Adolescents are increasingly believed to be capable of
medical decision making; most courts, however, would not allow an adolescent to refuse
life-saving treatment.
Limitation of parental decision-making rights in the context of medical care is,
within the history of legal aspects of the parent-child relationship, a modern
phenomenon. At common law, a minor (at that time, a person under 21) was
effectively a chattel of his or her parents [1]. Child abuse was not prohibited
anywhere in the United States until the early years of the twentieth century. A
physician who treated a minor, except in a life-threatening emergency, without
parental consent could be liable, even in case of a satisfactory medical outcome, to
the minor's father for interference with his control ofhis child [2].
PARENTAL REFUSAL OF TREATMENT
As concern increased in the early years of this century for the well-being of
children in our society, more and more courts began to intervene when parents
refused to allow medical treatment for seriously ill children. Today a parent's failure
to provide "adequate" medical care for a child is a criminal offense under all states'
child neglect laws [3]. It is clear that a competent adult has the right to refuse
treatment for himself or herself. In all states where parents, on the basis of their
religious conviction, have refused to allow necessary treatment of their children,
these parents would still be found to be "neglectful," even though their right to
religious freedom is protected by the First Amendment [4]. All courts which have
considered the matter (and there have been hundreds of these cases, doubtless in
every state) have held that a Jehovah's Witness whose child's condition requires
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blood transfusions has no right to forbid the procedure on grounds of religious
conviction [5].
Thus court intervention, based on the principle that failure to obtain adequate
medical care for a child is a violation of state child neglect laws, is an option that
exists when physicians and hospitals consider it appropriate. In almost all cases,
judges comply virtually automatically when such requests are initiated by the child's
physicians [6]. When court action is initiated by welfare or other governmental
agencies, schools, officious neighbors, or the like, however, under circumstances in
which the attending physician concurs with the parents' refusal, the parents' wishes
invariably prevail [7].
Ifthe parents reject the treatment plan proposed by the child's physician and wish
to have another physician treat him or her by a method disapproved by most or even
all of "mainstream medicine," however, courts will not intervene. Judges take the
position that the child neglect laws require parents to take a child to a licensed
physician. Once they have done that and follow the physician's orders, a court will
not intervene just because most physicians would think that the physician selected is
not providing adequate therapy. Ifphysicians believe that the treatment is unaccept-
able, judges believe that the solution to the problem is to refer the matter to the state
Board of Medical Examiners or other professional disciplinary body, not to ask a
judge to choose which of two treatments a child should receive.
Most court orders involve treatment that can be given during one stay in the
hospital. For example, a Jehovah's Witness couple's child is hit by a car and is
brought to the emergency room. The parents are told that the child needs surgery,
which cannot be performed safely without transfusions, they refuse to consent, the
court order is received, the child is operated on and receives blood, recovers, and
goes home. No further transfusions are required.
In oncology cases, however, the situation is usually complicated by the fact that the
child will need treatment on an outpatient basis for months or years. Court orders
notwithstanding, if a child is at home with his or her parents and they wish to refuse
treatment, they may decide to take the child and run away [8].
The most famous case of this sort was the one involving Chad Green [9]. Chad,
aged three, had leukemia with, according to his physician, a 50-75 percent chance of
five-year survival. Although at first Chad's parents agreed to chemotherapy, they
soon decided, in addition, to treat Chad themselves with laetrile and megavitamins.
When the physicians warned the parents that laetrile could be toxic, the Greens
removed Chad from all treatment. The Massachusetts Department of Public Wel-
fare, on behalf of the physicians and the hospital, prevailed in a request to the court
for an order for treatment. The parents appealed and, although they conceded the
court's right to order chemotherapy, asked to supplement it with their own remedies.
No acceptable expert witness testified on the Greens' behalf, and the Department of
Public Welfare presented testimony by five physicians that laetrile was not only
worthless but could be harmful. The court found that Chad had a high probability of
remission with chemotherapy and that laetrile could cause cyanide poisoning, so the
parents were ordered to continue the chemotherapy and stop the laetrile. The
Greens fled with Chad to Mexico to escape the court order, and he died there.
In contrast, a New York court allowed parents to arrange for the administration of
laetrile to their eight-year-old son, who had Hodgkin's disease [10]. The difference
was that the child was under the care of a New York physician who believed in the
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efficacy of laetrile, and the judge refused to "choose sides" in a medical argument
about choices oftherapy.
Apediatriconcologist caringfor achildwhose parents reject the therapies offered
and who is contemplating a petition for a court order must also decide whether the
benefit to the child is worth the emotional trauma to child and parents ofasking the
court to put the child in afoster home during the period oftreatment. Removing the
child from the control ofthe parents maybe the onlywayto assure that the childwill
be brought in for treatment. Thus only when the physician reasonably believes that
the treatment will be curative or at least is fairly certain of the expectation of a
long-term remission can this course ofaction bejustified.
Wresting a dying child from his parents and putting him in the home of strangers
while he suffers from the side effects ofchemotherapy only to prolong his dying but
not to save his life is an unimaginable trauma to inflict on a child and a family. For
example, if a child has a brain tumor from which full and long-term recovery would
be unlikely, but surgery could remove the tumor, extend the child's life span and
leave him blind, many parents would refuse the surgery. In these situations, the
physician should not make the decision about askingfor court-ordered treatment on
the basis of"Will we win?" (towhich the answer is probably "Yes") but "Should we
try?" "Is it worth it?" is the question to be answered. In no case where physicians
have gone to court, however, seeking an order for treatment of a child with cancer
has it been denied.
RESEARCH
A parent, however, does have the right to refuse an investigational drug or
therapy. As far as can be determined, there have never been any cases on the point,
but it is likely that there will be. If a child has a malignancy from which he or she is
likelytodie, there is noapproved treatment, all therapieswhichhave been tried have
been ineffective, and early clinical trials indicate that results from use of an
investigational drug might be promising, would a court view parental refusal as
neglect and order the druggiven? The answer is no [11].
Federal regulations applicable ifdata about a drug is to be submitted to the Food
and Drug Administration for a New Drug Application, or if research about the
therapy is conducted or supported by the federal government require that a consent
form include a statement that
... Participation is voluntary, refusal to participate will involve no penalty
or loss ofbenefits to which the subject is otherwise entitled, and the subject
may discontinue participation at any timewithout penalty [12].
Because there is a federally mandated right to refuse to participate, it is most
improbable that any court has jurisdiction to order investigational therapies or to
compel a parent to sign a consent form.
CONSENT BY MINORS TO TREATMENT
Since the 1940s, there has been an increasing tendency by both legislatures and
courts to allow adolescents more autonomyin decisionmaking in many areas oftheir
lives, including decisions about health care.
Beginning in the early 1960s, physicians besieged state legislators to do something
about the fact that adolescents were contributing to an epidemic ofvenereal disease
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in this country. Because physicians were reluctant to treat them without parental
consent, these youngpeople were not seekingmedical care; failure tobe treatedwas,
of course, worsening the epidemic. By the end of the 1960s, all states had enacted
statutes permitting treatment of minors (usually at any age) for venereal disease
without parental knowledge [13]. Some statutes specifically forbade billing parents
for the care, lest they investigate the reason for the visit [14]. In the early 1970s,
legislatures provided the same statutory protection for physicians who dealt with
adolescents' problems involving drug and alcohol abuse.
Alsobeginning in the 1960s, many states enacted statutes providing that minors of
agiven agemightconsentgenerallytomedical orsurgical care. The agesranged from
14, to a number at 15, to manypermitting consent at 16 [15]. About halfthe states, by
now, have suchgeneral treatment statutes, although most exempt abortion and organ
donation from the scope ofthese provisions.
Regardless of statutory authority, however, it has been at least 40 years since any
court in the United States has allowed parents of a minor to sue a physician for
treating their adolescent without their consent when consent was given by a patient
of about 15 or over [16]. Courts uphold treatment given when the patient is mature
enough to give the same sort ofinformed consent thatwould be expected ofan adult
[17]. Thispractice hasbecome known as the "mature minor" rule. It isunlikelyin the
extreme, however, that any oncologist would agree to treat a minor whose parent is
present in the young person's lifewithout full involvement ofthe parent.
Except in emergencies, hospitals refuse to admit minors without parental consent
for the simple reason that the parent, not the adolescent, is insured, and the named
insured in the health insurance policymust agree tobefinanciallyresponsible forthe
dependent's medical bills. Thus most conflicts about parental consent to treatment
today arise from non-hospital outpatient care and for problems more minor than
most confronting the oncologist's patients.
The "emancipated minor" has been a concept since the early days ofEnglish law.
Its modern definition is that of a minorwho is married, in the military service (much
less likely now than it waswhen the age ofmajoritywas 21, and many minors were in
military service at 18 or 19), or is not living at home and notfinanciallydependent on
his orherparents. In some states, a minorwho isliving at homebutself-supporting is
considered emancipated. In almost all states, an unmarried minor mother is emanci-
pated even if she is living with her parents, and, in some states, a pregnant minor is
emancipated.
Ifan adolescent meets the definition ofemancipation in the state where he or she
isliving, he or she mayconsent to medical care, buy and sell real estate, and sue orbe
sued without appointment of a guardian. In the context of medical care, an
emancipated minor may consent without parental involvement to any medical care
[18]. The parent is not responsible for the cost of the care, and the minor alone is
responsible for payment [19].
REFUSAL BY A MINOR OF TREATMENT
The converse situation occurs when a minorwishes to refuse treatment that his or
her parent wishes the physician to provide. There are far fewer cases on this point,
presumably because physicians will not perform genuinely elective treatment (such
as cosmetic surgery) on an unwilling patient. In the context of "necessary" medical
care, aslong as the adolescent's life is not at stake, most courtswill permit thepatient
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to decide. Most ofthe cases have involved situations where a physician attempted to
get acourtorderforsurgerywhere the objectionsbyparents andthe adolescentwere
based on religious grounds, such as a Jehovah's Witness family whose adolescent
requires surgery for a serious but not life-threatening problem [20].
There is only one case that has reached the appellate level in which an adolescent
wished to refuse life-saving treatment [21]. A 17-year-old Jehovah's Witness was
admitted to the University ofChicago Hospitals with leukemia. She and her parents
adamantly refused blood transfusions. The trialjudge met with her for many hours.
He established to his own satisfaction that she understood her situation, understood
that she would die without treatment, and that her decision was based on her own
religious convictions and not on parental coercion or fear of abuse by them if she
consented. He therefore allowed her to refuse onthe same basisthat anyadultwould
be allowed to refuse. That decision was upheld on appeal. It is most improbable,
however, that many courts would allow a minor to refuse life-saving treatment [22].
There areveryfewcases involving treatmentofchildrenwithcancer. Mostofthose
involve parents who are members of religious groups who object to blood transfu-
sions or to any form of medical treatment. There is ample precedent for believing
that, as is true ofother sorts ofchildhood illnesses in which religious objections are
the source ofcourt-ordered treatments, such situationswill always result in an order
to treat whenever such a request is made to the court by the treating oncologist. It is
also clear that, if parents wish to have a child treated by a non-physician (such as a
chiropractor who claims to have a cure for cancer), court orders will be virtually
automatic. It is less clear, however, if parental objection or the refusal of an
adolescent patient is based on a wish to participate in treatment espoused by
physicians in a "minority ofopinion" within the medical profession that a court will
intervene. In these cases, courts usually hold that the legal responsibilities ofparents
are metwhen the child is in the care ofa licensed physician and that it is not the role
ofcourts to determine the truth or the best treatment in a situation where there is a
difference ofmedical opinion.
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